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Abstract
Initially coined by Weizenbaum in 1976, ‘alien’ thought refers to the radical difference with which ‘thinking machines’ 
approach the process of thinking. The contemporary paradox of over-determination and indeterminacy—caused largely by 
algorithmic decision-making in the civic realm—makes these differences both more entangled and more difficult to navigate. 
In this essay, I trace over-determination to Leibniz and Turing’s axiomatic procedures and to instrumental rationality, and 
I trace indeterminacy to the mid-twentieth century co-development of computers and neurosciences to advance the follow-
ing proposition: understanding alien thought requires understanding incomputability, temporal swarming, and inscriptive-
significational errance. Understanding these phenomena in turn requires understanding thinking by doing, distributed think-
ing, and ontological indeterminacy. All are present in machinic operations as well as in the twentieth century experimental 
artistic practices of artists such as Duchamp, Cage, and Xu. These practices rely on indeterminate procedures and function 
as diagrammatic machines. A diagrammatic machine is neither abstract nor particular; neither an idea that is determining in 
the supreme instance, nor an infrastructure that is determining in the last instance, but rather instantiates a real yet to come 
(Deleuze and Guattari in A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia: Trans. Massumi B, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1987). In this essay, indeterminate artistic practices are used as an entry into alien thought and its cor-
relates—infinity and complexity—by way of aesthetic analogy.
Keywords Indeterminacy · Over-determination · Infinity · Complexity · Distributed thinking by doing
1 Introduction
For the Medieval thinkers, the famous puzzle of how many 
angels can dance on the head of a pin was a question about 
the relationship of the infinite god to the finite world. If god 
the creator was all-powerful, logically, he should be able to 
bid an infinite number of angels to dance on the head of a 
pin. At the same time, the Medieval thinkers believed that 
no infinite collection could, in fact, arise in the finite world, 
or appear to finite human beings.1 Apart from shedding light 
on the rift between the realm of ideality and materiality and 
corporeality, characteristic of the two-world theory derived 
from Western metaphysics (Nishitani 1991), this paradox 
also sheds light on human inability to process complexity 
as multiplicity, collapsed orders of magnitude, virtuality 
and/or vertiginous speed. Unlike the infinite god who, we 
could say, ‘operates’ with complexity, multiplicity, poly-
chromaticy as well as with unity, finite human beings need 
common denominators, unifying factors, and, often, also, 
reduction. In the two-world theory—where finite beings are 
created from a primordial overflowing, or emanation, from 
the One, the source of all being—the world of essence, infin-
ity, and eternity, is separate from the world of appearance, 
finitude, and temporality. Moreover, the degree of separation 
is marked by the logic of wholes and parts. A whole (the 
infinite One) is a superior term because it denotes plenitude, 
the presence of all parts; a part (the finite human) is inferior 
because it denotes incompleteness.
There are many reasons why finite, corporeal, actually 
existing humans—seen as infinitesimal parts of a vast ple-
num or not—cannot see an infinite number of non-corporeal, 
 * Natasha Lushetich 
 n.lushetich@dundee.ac.uk
1 University of Dundee, Dundee, UK
1 This puzzle has occasionally been used in mathematics, too. How-
ever, its origin, according to sources such as William Chillingworth’s 
Religion of Protestants: A Safe Way to Salvation, Clarke, Oxford, 
1638, is in the writing of the Medieval philosopher and Dominican 
friar Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries and interlocutors.
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virtual beings dancing in the impossibly small space of a 
pinhead.2 I’ll focus on the most pertinent one for the pur-
poses of this discussion. ‘Ordinary’ human consciousness, 
also called thetic or phenomenal consciousness, cannot per-
ceive—or conceive of—infinity due to the limited nature of 
human perception and the ingrained ideas about the possible 
and impossible. Shaped by what Drew Leder has called the 
‘phenomenological vector’, human perception is confined 
by the ‘culturally formatted structure of experience’, which 
makes possible ‘certain practical or interpretative directions’ 
while discouraging others (Leder 1990, 150). Despite the 
fact that there are, of course, certain ‘existential/biological 
invariants that shape human experience in general’—humans 
do not have eyes in the back of their heads, which is why 
they do not have 360° vision—the phenomenological vector 
is created from an ambiguous, potentially infinite ‘set of pos-
sibilities and tendencies’ that take on definite shape ‘within 
a cultural context’ (151). In other words, the embedded-ness 
of the organism in the environment and its day-to-day praxis 
constitute the organism’s perceptual world, which, in the 
case of humans, cannot be separated from their culture’s/
cultures’ dominant ideologies. As we know from Andy 
Clark’s work, the mind is embodied, embedded, extended, 
and enactive (Clark 2010). Conceptual demarcations and 
daily practices are not separate. For example, the Aivilik, 
who do not conceptually separate space and time, do not 
view space as a static enclosure but rather as a dynamic 
situation, a direction in operation. When handed a copy of 
an illustrated magazine, they will not turn it ‘right side up’ 
and are ‘highly amused when the Westerners do so’ since, 
for the Aivilik, images can be viewed regardless of whether 
they are horizontal, vertical or diagonal—all directions are 
‘right side up’ (Montagu 1986, 300). The inability to view/
grasp images from multiple positions is like saying: I can 
only watch television when standing up. If I sit down the vis-
ual information becomes incomprehensible to me. Clearly, 
ideas about the possible and impossible are shaped by usage 
and praxis, much like practices are, in turn, shaped by the 
inherited, taken-for-granted ideas about what exists and does 
not exist. This is also the reason why the ability to penetrate 
the ‘perceptual unworld’, so to speak—as spatial, temporal, 
energetic and material complexity unformatted by culture, 
dominant ideas, education and/or cumulative experience—
has often been associated with mysticism.
For Karen Barad, as for many quantum theorists,3 time, 
like space and matter, is diffractive and indeterminate. Tem-
poral and spatial indeterminacy manifests in many ways: 
a wave can behave like a wave or a particle depending on 
how it’s measured; a particle can be in two places at once, 
in a state of superposition. Time is discontinuous; multiple 
temporalities exist at the same time, as a superposition of 
all possible histories. The past is present in the present, not 
only as a result of past actions—we break a vase and the next 
time we come into the room the vase smithereens are on the 
floor—but as perpetual change. Much like space and mat-
ter are not definitively ‘there’, in one place, at one time, the 
vacuum is neither ‘(determinately) empty, nor is it (deter-
minately) not empty’ (Barad 2017, 54). Its virtual particles 
are ‘non/existences that teeter on the edge of the infinitely 
fine blade between being and nonbeing’ (54). To explain 
that the virtual particles are not in the void but are ‘of the 
void’—because the void is not an enclosure but, rather, ‘a 
lively tension […] bursting with innumerable imaginings of 
what-could-be/might-yet- have-been’—which she calls the 
‘dance of the vacuum’ (56)4—Barad resorts to the medi-
eval Torah commentator Rashi’s explanation of the Hebrew 
version of the first verse of Genesis. The opening verse of 
Genesis is B’reishit, which does not say: in the beginning 
god created xyz.
It says something very different, because, grammati-
cally, B’reishit is the first of two nouns in a row, as in the 
phrase B’nei Yisreal—the children of Isreal (Rashi quoted 
in Barad 2017, 42). If the phrase read ‘B’nei—the children 
of—without ‘Yisreal’ it would be incomplete. Likewise, 
B’reishit means ‘in’ or ‘at’ ‘the beginning of’ but there is no 
second noun to indicate what B’reishit is the beginning of. 
In other words, the beginning itself is here an ‘of’ relation, 
as is time. This is very different from the concept of time 
evident in the phrase ‘in the beginning of time there was x’, 
where we know that time is a dimension or a medium which 
has (or had) a beginning. For Rashi, as for Barad (42), the 
incompleteness of B’reishit is a move that opens time to 
infinite interpretation not only in the sense of quiddity—
‘what is time?’—but also quality—‘how is time time?’—as 
well as quantity—‘how many times are there?’ and ‘is this 
number finite or infinite? B’reishit is a relation of irreducible 
complexity, which invites multiperspectivalism.
But even if we replace the dancing angels with the danc-
ing virtual particles, can we say that we have a clear idea of 
virtual infinity and/or complexity? That we know it? Most 
3 See David Bohm, e.g. Problems in the Basic Concept of Physics, 
Birbeck, London, 1963, and Quantum Implications, Routledge, Lon-
don, 1991.
4 Walter Benjamin, too, critiques what he calls ‘homogenous, empty 
time’ a sequence of identical and linear moments, characteristic of 
capitalist Modernity, and argues for ‘now time’ which retains the 
potential for transformation in every moment, however, minuscule. 
Theses on the Philosophy of History. Illuminations. Trans. Harry 
Zorn Shocken, New York.
2 For Georg Cantor, who developed the set theory (collections of 
objects of finite and infinite elements) infinites had different sizes. 
Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and the Philosophy of the Infinite. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
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likely, we’ll agree that we know about it rather than know 
it. Yet—to return to the Aivilik example—if we have the 
experience of navigating environments like water (in swim-
ming or diving) or snow (in bobsleighing) and are visually 
familiar with the Aivilik territory (Nanavut, part of the 
Canadian Arctic archipelago), it is possible to understand, 
by way of aesthetic analogy, what it means for space–time 
to be a direction in operation. Aesthetics, in this context, is 
not a beauty or harmony ideal or a pleasing arrangement of 
objects. It’s the sum total of that which can be experienced, 
a modality of comprehension that enables us to understand 
one thing in terms of another, or two or more things. As 
such, an aesthetic analogy is neither abstract, like applying 
a formula to different contexts, nor is it so particular as not 
to be relatable to other contexts.
In what follows, indeterminate artistic procedures (which 
are themselves based on deterministic parameters) are used 
as an aesthetic analogy to enable a qualitative understand-
ing of ‘alien’ thought in a non-formulaic way. First coined 
by AI pioneer Joseph Weizenbaum, and subsequently theo-
rised by Ian Bogost, Yuk Hui, and Luciana Parisi, ‘alien’ 
thought stems from the simple fact that, for Weizenbaum, 
the domain of thinking and intelligence is, with the excep-
tion of formal problems, ‘determined by man’s [sic] human-
ity’ (Weizenbaum 1976, 223). Weizenbaum concludes that 
‘every other intelligence, however, great, must necessarily 
be alien to the human domain’ (223; emphasis original). In 
the last decade, the expression ‘alien’ thought has been used 
to discuss spatio-temporal and interactional trajectories of 
(what are usually referred to as) inanimate objects and the 
resulting need for an ‘alien’ phenomenology (Bogost 2012); 
developments based on recursive behaviours of technical 
objects (Hui 2019); and circuits of reproduction based on 
learning architectures and the contextual use of content that 
defy the servo-mechanical model of machinic operations 
(Parisi 2019).
My contention is that indeterminate artistic procedures 
are particularly well suited to understanding the otherness of 
‘alien’ thought for two reasons. First, self-supervised (rather 
than humanly supervised) machine learning is stochastic as 
‘only the input x is given from which an unknown pattern 
y must be discovered’ (Pasquinelli 2019, 5). To a much 
smaller degree, this is also true of other algorithmic proce-
dures that rely on vast amounts of big data, since their results 
can, in fact, never be predicted with complete accuracy. Sec-
ond, indeterminate artistic procedures operate as diagram-
matic machines. For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, a 
diagrammatic machine is neither abstract nor particular. It 
is neither a transcendental idea that is determining in the 
supreme instance nor is it an infrastructure that is determin-
ing in the last instance; a diagrammatic machine does not 
have a representational function either (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 142). Rather, it plays a ‘piloting role’ constructing’ a 
nascent ‘real’—a real yet to come (142).
In the third decade of the twenty-first century, there is an 
urgent need to understand the paradox of increasing over-
determination and indeterminacy unleashed by machinic and 
algorithmic operations (where over-determination stands for 
the application of shortcutting procedures to decision pro-
cesses resulting in ‘automatic’ account termination, or ‘auto-
matic’ health insurance claim rejection. Phenomenologi-
cally speaking, we are thrown into a perceptual world that 
is simultaneously instrumentarian and chaotic, to use Sho-
shana Zuboff’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s astute respective 
observations. In instrumentarianism, ‘users’ have become ‘a 
means to profits in new behavioral futures markets’ where 
they are neither the producer nor the product but ‘the human 
natural source’ (Zuboff 2019, 13; emphasis original). For 
Deleuze and Guattari, chaos is not creative turbulence; it is 
the ‘infinite speed’ with which forms and objects ‘appear 
fleetingly and disappear immediately, without consistency 
or reference, without consequence’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 118). This is due to many factors: regimes of machinic 
optimisation that desecrate existential terrains5 and destabi-
lise deeply ingrained ideas about durability and ephemeral-
ity,6 ultimately leading to a necropolitical brand of instru-
mentality.7 Yet over-determination is also accompanied by 
unprecedented complexity, embroiled scales of magnitude, 
and, for humans, impossible-to-grasp temporalities, such as 
the vertiginous speed produced in high frequency trading. 
Although we could say, in general terms, that the notion of 
‘alien’ thought is formulated against the relief of the human 
as a privileged agent of thought, which belongs to a spe-
cific (Western or global North) heritage, and that even a 
cursory glance at recent titles such as Eduardo Kohn’s How 
Forests Think, shows how limited this view is—not to men-
tion an entire history of Asian and Indigenous thought—it is 
important not to force the inherent instrumentality of many 
machinic/algorithmic operations that regulate health, educa-
tion, justice, finance and economics, and ‘alien thought’ into 
a single theoretical armature.
5 The digital embroils psychophysical territories of habit—ceaseless 
digital changes are like permission-less rearrangements of private 
spaces. They are both invasive and aggressive and often require extra 
time and energy which, when, combined dozens of similar ‘tasks’ 
exhaust human energy beyond renewal.
6 On the internet, the average life of an URL is 40 days, thousands 
of times shorter than the life of a book, yet people who have passed 
away continue to exist on social media for years.
7 Although necropolitics as ‘making and letting die’ (Mbembe 2003) 
is usually interpreted as overt killing, there are many covert forms 
of necropolitics which do not maim or kill but exhaust, abandon and 
denigrate. The Aesthetics of Necropolitics, Rowman and Littlefield 
International, London.
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2  The paradox of over‑determination 
and indeterminacy
There is, of course, an undeniable relationship of com-
putation to deterministic, rule-based, provable, and non-
particular reasoning. It can be traced to Gottfried Wilhem 
Leibniz’s mathesis universalis, a universal mode of reason-
ing, unencumbered by particularities, whether of a cultural 
or individual perceptual, sensorial or educational kind, as 
well as a mode of reasoning that is conclusively provable 
and applicable to any subject matter. Despite the fact that 
the idea of universal reasoning was not new when it first 
appeared—it was also propagated by René Descartes, in the 
form of ‘a general science which explains all the points that 
can be raised concerning order and measure irrespective of 
the subject matter’ (Descartes 1985, 19)—Leibniz’s contri-
bution was far more significant than an orderly system of 
measurement. It consisted of what he referred to as charac-
teristica universalis—an ‘alphabet’ of abstract symbols, rep-
resenting the entirety of human knowledge in non-variable 
terms (Leibniz 1985). This process, which sought to create 
validity and continuity of thought beyond the human frame, 
human temporality and particularity, consisted of a series 
of sequence- and logic-locked steps.8 Although mathesis 
universalis was never completed it was an undeniable influ-
ence on the work of the twentieth century mathematicians 
and computer scientists, among whom also Alan Turing. 
For Turing, computing was equivalent to a rule-governed, 
sequential succession of finite steps based on deductive 
inference, which does not allow for internal change or varia-
tion.9 Likewise, algorithms were, for Turing, a form of auto-
mated thought in the sense of formalised, sequence-locked 
procedure, a closed system. For Leibniz, as for Turing, cal-
culation and computation, which are abstract, rather than 
embodied, embedded in the environment, and particular, 
were a form of universal reasoning precisely because they 
were axiomatic—based on invariable deductive procedures 
where the validity of the input automatically translates into 
the validity of the output. However, neither Leibniz nor 
Turing lived in an era where such non-variable, ‘closed’ 
logics affected human lives in most, if not all spheres, from 
education and finance to dating and health.
The chief problem with such abstract, axiomatic reason-
ing is, of course, value: existential, social, natural, or cul-
tural. One does not have to be a moral philosopher to see that 
axiomatic procedures subsume not only particular value but 
also particularity as such under generic principles. They can-
not not be instrumental. Having co-developed with industrial 
rationalisation, instrumental rationality is more problematic 
today than ever because of its scale and ubiquity. Deter-
mining ‘expectations’ of how ‘objects in the environment’ 
should behave (Weber 1978, 24), instrumental rationality 
equates these expectations with ‘givens’. As members of 
the Frankfurt School have argued, a process of reasoning or 
calculation devoid of any relation to embodiment, a thing 
or a being’s embedded-ness in the environment has totali-
tarian tendencies as well as disastrous effects (Horkheimer 
and Adorno 1972; Horkheimer 2012).10 Despite the differ-
ence of half a century, the crucial insight of the Frankfurt 
school—that the instrumentalising power of automation is 
simultaneously the automation of power—is by no means 
trivial, as can be seen from the widespread use of predatory 
machinic procedures that automate difference control and 
anomaly detection, perpetuating racism, sexism, and clas-
sism in crime prediction and medical diagnostics, among 
many other examples (Panagia 2017; Eubanks 2018). The 
‘universal method of reasoning’, based on sequence- and 
logic-locked procedure, here amounts to pre-emption from 
procedure or ‘future from structure’ reducing ethical ques-
tions to technical management and continuing the mantra of 
industrial rationality: progress, productivity, efficiency, in a 
far worse—because automated—way.11
When speaking of human intelligence, the shortest defini-
tion of stupidity is perhaps: the use of the same, simplistic, 
‘shortcutting’ formulas in vastly different situations, with-
out any regard for the situated-ness of the situation. The 
shortest definition of intelligence, by contrast, might be: a 
subtle dance with novel complexity. Dancing here does not 
refer to litheness alone. It refers to sensitivity, responsive-
ness, and, by implication, also, to respons-a-bility, in addi-
tion to the ability (affordance or willingness) to pursue a 
longer, more complicated path without immediate results 
(or perhaps no results at all) to allow the suchness of the 
dancing partner/s—their quiddity and specificity—to come 
to the fore. By contrast, ‘future from structure’ manipulates 
possibility into probability, and probability into necessity 
reducing relationships of relevance to those of causation. 
As Franco Berardi has extensively argued, automation is 
‘the submission of the cognitive activity to logical and tech-
nological chains’, ‘a form of engendered determinism’, and, 
as such, the ‘fundamental act of power’ (Berardi 2020, 42). 
10 For Horkheimer, for example, industrial rationality turns freedom 
into subjugation because it automates both individual human and 
society-level behaviour (Horkheimer 2012).
11 The Nazi concentration camp, as Achille Mbembe has argued is a 
prime example of the necropolitical tendencies of efficiency.
8 Interestingly, Leibniz is also the champion of the essentialist under-
standing of identity—the rational being’s invariable continuity over 
time, like the proverbial Theseus’ ship whose ‘unchangeable essence’ 
is reflected in the continuity of its form and appearance.
9 Turing was also influenced by Kurt Gödel’s 1931 theories of unde-
cidability and engaged with David Hilbert’s 1928 Entscheidungsprob-
lem.
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Equations like ‘if you don’t pay your car insurance you’ll 
be automatically locked out of your car’ are inscribed in the 
machine as logical necessities because they ‘convert real 
events into activators of mathematical functions’ (43). They 
are of course not logical necessities but instrumentalist, 
shortcutting operations that benefit particular parties: cor-
porations and governments. However, artificial, like human, 
stupidity does not mean that AI should be viewed solely as 
an extension of instrumental rationality.12 Much like clas-
sical physics exists alongside quantum theory, in scientific 
work, and in curricula, despite the fact that quantum theory 
negates most, if not all, postulates of classical physics, inde-
terminacy, in the broad field of AI, co-exists alongside over-
determination. Dance is not altogether absent as automated 
procedures did not develop on their own.
Plasticity played a key role in the mid-twentieth century 
co-development of computers and neurosciences. Discuss-
ing the indeterminate element present in Turing’s think-
ing machine, which, it should not be forgotten, developed 
amidst undecidability and the halting problem theories,13 
David Bates and Nima Bassiri refer to Donald Hebb’s 
famous phrase ‘neurons that fire together wire together’ to 
establish a connection between plasticity or deviance from 
set routes and routines (Hebb quoted in Bates and Bassiri 
2015, 195). Pointing to the fact that contingency exists in 
human and computer synapses alike they go on to suggest 
that at the time when the first computer was being concep-
tualised, the digital was not yet fully aligned with automa-
ticity (195). The co-development of AI and experimental 
neuroscience meant that the plastic brain offered an insight 
into unpredictable leaps in human behaviour and thinking, 
related to hidden capacities that go beyond habitual behav-
iour. In machines, this referred to unpredictable leaps in 
functional mechanisms, which were often treated as errors, 
but which were not errors, merely different developments. 
Neuropsychological discourses focused on the disorders of 
the injured brain and its ability to recover functioning after 
injury indicating that the brain ‘was at once a site of open-
ness and a space of artificial mechanisms’ (200). Quoting 
William James, Bates and Bassiri conclude that ‘[p]lasticity 
means the possession of a structure weak enough to yield 
to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once’; 
(James quoted in Bates and Bassiri 202). This further means 
sensitivity and responsiveness to the environment as well 
as to change. Errance—wandering or movement away from 
the established or programmed path or course—is inherent 
to thought. To emphasise the point about machinic plastic-
ity, the authors reiterate Gilbert Simondon’s famous remark: 
‘the true perfection of machines does not correspond to an 
increase in automation, but on the contrary to the fact that 
the functioning of a machine harbours a certain margin of 
indetermination (Simondon quoted in Bates and Bassiri 
2015, 214).
Seven decades later, we know, as Katherine Hayles has 
noted in relation to Norbert Weiner’s cybernetic paradigm 
of circular feedback, and as Yuk Hui has extensively argued, 
that in machinic and algorithmic operations, feedback is 
recursive and spiral, rather than circular (Hayles 2005, 241; 
Hui 2019). This means that feedback does not reinforce 
self−same operations but rather creates an internal dynamic 
that opens onto the ‘undecidable and the unknowable’ (Hay-
les 2017, 202). Furthermore, contemporary machine learn-
ing uses back propagation to train multilayer architectures, 
which makes feedback less relevant than aggregation, de-
aggregation, and re-aggregation, all of which create inter-
nal change and, therefore, emergent behaviours and alien 
thought.14 In a (still) largely anthropocentric tradition, 
derived from Euro-centric metaphysical and scientific tra-
ditions with a global reach,15 there are bound to be disagree-
ments about what constitutes other-than human thought.
For example, for Hayles, cognition, and particularly 
non-conscious cognition, is different from thinking. Think-
ing, for her, includes ‘reasoning abstractly, creating and 
using verbal languages, constructing mathematical theo-
rems [and] composing music’ (Hayles 2017, 14). Many 
of Hayles’s examples rely on a specific faculty and have a 
teleological dimension, such as constructing mathematical 
theorems or composing music. I do not think that a tele-
ological approach—completing a work (a whole), such as 
(traditional) musical composition—should be considered 
(higher-order) thinking whereas rhizomatic, indetermi-
nate, non-teleological thought, should not. First, anything 
that is ‘complete’ or complex is so from the human point 
of view. Second, the division into conscious and uncon-
scious operations, both in humans, and as a separation of 
humans from other-than-humans, belongs, once again, to 
the Western/global North heritage which is only one among 
many schools of thought. Although a detailed discussion of 
consciousness and non-consciousness is beyond the scope 
of this essay, suffice it to mention that Eastern mind-body 
theories, such as those of Shigenori Nagatomo do not differ-
entiate between ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ behaviour in 
12 An argument developed by Luciana Parisi in Instrumental Reason, 
Algorithmic Capitalism and the Incomputable (2016).
13 The problem of determining whether an arbitrary computer pro-
gramme will halt, after an x number of years, first proposed by David 
Hilbert in 1928.
14 This is not about the obvious difference between human and 
machining reasoning, such as the role played by compassion.
15 It could be argued that the current hypercapitalist expansion into 
transhumanism and cognitive augmentation is a form of neo-sub-
stantivist ideology serving a neo-colonial agenda concomitant with 
instrumentarianism (Zuboff 2019).
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humans or non-humans (Nagatomo 1992). Rather, there is a 
spectrum of hazy-to-clear-consciousness movements, direc-
tions and dispositions. Interoception—the internal operation 
of an organism that can be applied to machines, too—is, on 
this account, not not conscious. It simply occupies a different 
place on the spectrum, which has no final point, no ‘clearest 
of all forms of clear consciousness’. Different animals have 
different interpenetrations of different hues or intensities of 
hazy consciousness.16 Other conceptions of the relationship 
of sentience to sapience eschew consciousness altogether. 
For example, for Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, nature is not 
the universal ground of multiple cultures. On the contrary, 
a commonly shared culture is the ground for pan-sentient 
multi-naturalism (de Castro 2016). In similar fashion, in 
Chinese philosophy, where processual, in  situ creation 
entails the interpenetration of a vast quantity of existents, 
the emphasis is on dynamic co-articulation, represented by 
the principle of the one and the many17—or temporary unity 
in disparity—comparable to Whitehead’s principle of one 
and many (Wen 2010), and his process philosophy more 
generally.18
Following pragmatist,19 more specifically, John Dew-
ey’s notion of thought (Dewey 1976)—where (similarly to 
Nagatomo and Wen, and other more recent commentators 
on the relationship of pragmatist to Asian notions of think-
ing, such as Richard Shusterman’s20), thinking is consid-
ered actional, I use the word ‘thought’ to refer to temporal, 
spatial, material and immaterial emergence and dynamics. 
To return to one of Hayles’s examples: the difference here 
is between composing a (traditional) piece of music, where 
the composer steers the process in a particular direction, and 
experimental composition, which is neither teleological nor 
the work of a single agent, but rather a form of distributed 
thinking and co-evolution through relationality.
In a nutshell, my argument is that understanding ‘alien’ 
thought requires an understanding of (a) thinking by doing; 
(b) distributed other-than-human thinking (and, implicitly, 
agency); and (c) understanding the ontological indetermi-
nacy of the internal dynamics qualitatively, rather than in a 
formulaic way. Understanding these modalities of thought 
will, in turn, enable us to understand the indeterminacy of 
incomputability and n+ dimensions; of temporal swarm-
ing; and of inscriptive-significational errance. All are pre-
sent in machinic procedures as well as in the work of Mar-
cel Duchamp, John Cage, and Xu Bing. As we know from 
Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (Gard-
ner 2011), there are many non-abstract human modalities 
of thought. A tennis player thinks by doing; in and through 
movement, a complex interplay of rhythm, action, reaction, 
and tactics that includes the environment, the various game 
elements, other players, and is kinaesthetic as well as inter-
actional. Additionally, indeterminate artistic procedures del-
egate what, in the above example, is the synthesising agency 
of the player, to the environment, time, rhythm, procedure, 
material and immaterial objects. They think by doing in a 
distributed manner where distributed agency does not pre-
exist action, but, rather, forms and transforms within the 
action itself (Ingold 2018). Lastly, indeterminate artistic 
procedures rely on deterministic structures, which is why 
they can be compared to machinic/algorithmic procedures. 
They are not arbitrary, random, or disordered. Rather, they 
use both deterministic parameters and randomness to cue 
ontological indeterminacy, which is why they can be said to 
operate as diagrammatic machines.
3  Duchamp, incomputability 
and n + dimensions
In a single sentence, the work of the ‘father of conceptual 
art’, Marcel Duchamp, can be described as the study of the 
ways in which diagrammatic machines produce and repro-
duce forms, objects, and ideas. The time Duchamp spent as 
a librarian at the Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, Paris, in 
1913, led to his life-long interest in the dimensional param-
eters of thinking by doing. Much of his work with indeter-
minacy was indebted to the scientific work of the time, such 
as Henri Poincaré’s investigations of non-Euclidian geom-
etry, which refuted the invariant nature of geometrical theo-
rems.21 Duchamp’s 1914–16 Three Standard Stoppages is a 
21 More precisely, the fact that ‘we do not experiment on ideal 
straights or circles’ but on ‘material objects’ meant that the ‘axioms 
of geometry […] are neither synthetic a priori judgements nor experi-
mental facts but, instead, conventions’ (Poincaré quoted in Molder-
ings 2010, 42).
16 In Shigenori Nagatomo, the I, as the coming together of the sub-
ject and object body (or me and mine-ness), too, is rooted in hazy 
consciousness.
17 The principle of the one and the many forms the basis of Kitaro 
Nishida’s notion of paradoxical articulation, where (what may appear 
as) disparate existents co-articulate each other. See Nishida’s (1970) 
Fundamental Problems of Philosophy. Trans. Dilworth, D., Peter 
Brogren The Voyager Press, Tokyo.
18 Whitehead wrote extensively on the diversity of process types, 
including those that maintain the nature of an entity and those that 
change its properties. See Whitehead (1979) Process and Reality, 
Macmillan, USA.
19 In addition to Whitehead’s foregrounding of emergence and 
action, pragmatist philosophers’ conception of truth, such as C.S. 
Peirce’s, relies on emergent, temporarily stable belief in a process of 
engagement with the world. See Peirce (1972) The Fixation of Belief 
in Moore, E.C. (ed.) Charles Sanders Peirce: The Essential Writings, 
Harper and Row, New York, pp. 120–136.
20 See, for example, Richard Shusterman’s 2012 Thinking through 
the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
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direct response to Poincaré. Using a string metre, a reference 
to the platinum metre conserved in the Parisian library, but, 
in this case, a purposefully malleable material, Duchamp 
dropped three strings of 1 m in length from the height of 1 
m onto a black canvas. The obtained shapes, full of twists 
and curves, were used as a template to reproduce the 3 m 
in wood, which he subsequently encased and entitled Three 
Standard Stoppages.22
Duchamp encased only 3 m, however, he repeated the 
experiment many times. The string metre changed every time 
it was dropped, demonstrating that there is no such thing 
as a universal standard metre, both in terms of shape and 
length. More significantly, Duchamp delegated agency to 
string, gravity, air, momentum, time, and the consistency of 
the surface onto which the string pieces fell: canvas. He also 
used computational methods to record different time-steps 
on a canvas, a sampling process that monitored occurrences 
in time while relying on (nascent) mapping and visualisa-
tion techniques. Apart from using deterministic parameters 
to demonstrate indeterminacy, Duchamp also showed two 
aspects of incomputability. Firstly, the precise position and 
shape of the string metre is unknowable. And, secondly, the 
medial situated-ness of the process is inseparable from that 
process. For Cornelia Vismann, all media, understood both 
as mediatic relations and as gadgets, objects, programmes, 
and protocols, engage in auto-praxis [Eigenpraxis] (Viss-
mann 2013, 84). Moreover, no thing or process is ever inde-
pendent of its conditions of coming into being (space, time, 
and environmental forces), which is why, for Vismann, the 
agent-thing iteratively steers emergent processes in new, and, 
for humans, often unpredictable and imperceptible directions 
(84). Combining, one the one hand, Turing’s question of the 
limit of computability, and, on the other, Claude Shannon’s 
information theory where information does not apply to the 
individual message but to signal crafted from noise (Shan-
non 1949)—Gregory Chaitin suggests that computation, too, 
consists of unknowable probabilities (Chaitin 2005). Data 
entropy leads to algorithmic randomness resembling an infi-
nite series of coin tosses where the outcome of each toss is 
unrelated to the previous one. Chaitin’s name for this is pro-
cess is Omega—an infinitely long number whose digits, like 
Duchamp’s string metre (imagined as a kilometer, a hundred 
thousand or million kilometers) have no repeatable pattern.
Related to the halting problem—the question of whether 
or not a programme will halt after a thousand, million or 
billion years—Omega is ‘the concentrated distillation of all 
conceivable halting problems’ (Calude quoted in Chown 
2007, 328). As such, it is ‘a cabalistic number’ which ‘can 
be known of, but not known through human reason (Bennett 
quoted in Chown 2007, emphasis mine). As a sequentially 
ordered computational processing of zeros and ones, Omega 
shows that there is an internal, intrinsic dynamic at work in 
every computation process negating the teleological, logic- 
and sequence-locked view of computation where random-
ness is seen as an error in the computation’s formal logic. 
This further means that, like Duchamp’s Three Standard 
Stoppages, incomputability is an ontological possibility—a 
possibility of an indeterminate coming-into-being—within 
and inseparable from computation. In Three Standard Stop-
pages, we see this in a schematic, step-by-step (or metre-
by-metre) way; the example is useful precisely because it’s 
Fig. 1  Marcel Duchamp, The Bride Stripped Bare By Her Bach-
elors, Even (The Large Glass), 1915–1923. Philadelphia Museum 
of Art, Bequest of Katherine S. Dreier, 1952, 1952–98-1   © Artists 
Rights Society (ARS), New York / © Association Marcel Duchamp 
/ ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2021. Courtesy of Philadelphia 
Museum of Art, ADAGP and DACS
22 The box also contained a statement about ‘The Idea of Fabrica-
tion’: ‘[i] a straight horizontal thread 1 m long falls from a height of 
1 m straight onto a horizontal plane twisting as it pleases and cre-
ates a new image of the unit of length three patterns obtained in more 
or less similar conditions: considered in their relation to one another 
they are an approximate reconstruction of the measure of length. The 
three standard stoppages are the meter diminished’ (Duchamp and 
Schwarz 1975, 595).
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simple. Duchamp’s Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, 
Even or The Large Glass expands incomputability into 
n + dimensions. In this (famously opaque) work, which 
took Duchamp 8 years to make, from 1915 to 1923, small 
cause-effect relationships are displaced within higher-order 
principles inherent in the system causing (what looks like) 
incongruity (Fig. 1).23
As Duchamp repeated many times in his career, ‘three 
dimensions can only be the beginning of a fourth, fifth and 
sixth dimension, if you know how to get there’ (Duchamp in 
Tomkins 2013, 93). Referring to the fact that Albert Einstein 
called the fourth dimension the ‘fourth coordinate’—not the 
fourth dimension—and that time exists even ‘in a thin line’ 
(93), Duchamp insisted that all objects had n + dimensions, 
only that humans lacked (a) sense(s) to perceive them.24 
In his experimentations with these dimensions Duchamp 
turned to the Renaissance mathematician Girard Desargues 
and his analysis of the conic geometry of Renaissance per-
spective. Desargues argued that the lines emanating from 
a centre of perspective create cones through which planes 
can be intersected at various angles, and ‘images’ ‘’placed’ 
in a painting. The theorem he derived from this was: two 
triangles are in perspective axially’ if they are ‘in perspec-
tive centrally.’25(Kodokostas 2014; emphasis mine). The 
instability as well as interconnectedness of the various per-
spectival elements is precisely what we see in The Large 
Glass. The only difference is that The Large Glass is not 
a Renaissance perspective painting but oscillates between 
installation, sculpture, and performance, demonstrating the 
contingency of what are taken to be the immutable elements 
of geometry as well as art-making: horizon lines, centres of 
perspective, objects, forms, axes, sign systems, and, in the 
case of art-making: the agency of the artist. Building on his 
existing practices of deterministically ‘staged’ indetermi-
nacy Duchamp treated all those elements as variable. The 
variability of every single component of the work is also the 
reason why The Large Glass bears no relation whatsoever 
to received ideas about aesthetics, form, content, nor does it 
have a signature artistic ‘style’.
Rather, the work stages inter-dimensional conversations 
between space-time, movement, geometry, and process, 
explored through a sequence of micro-logical, cause-and-
effect steps. The only macro-logic can be found in the title, 
much like Chaitin’s ‘Omega’ serves as a linguistic delineator 
for a sphere of not-fully-defined meaning. Bride Stripped 
Bare by her Bachelors, Even brings together the mechanics 
of diverse erotic forces, which Duchamp studied through a 
series of arbitrarily determined procedures, interconnected 
via language games and chance operations. An example of a 
language game is the bride—whose ‘bodily envelope’, to use 
Duchamp’s words, is auto-mobilistic in nature26 (Duchamp 
1994, 62). Glass was used to durably capture ephemeral per-
formative actions. In one part of the work, the nine bache-
lors’ desire is materially embedded in the canvas with the aid 
of nine malic molds from which matches, dipped in colour, 
were fired at a photograph of white gauze creased by the 
wind using a children’s toy gun. The chance operations of 
the captured wind were amplified by the chance operations 
of the firing mechanism and transposed onto the glass in 
which holes were drilled. In other words, The Large Glass is 
a residue of procedurally determined, micro-causally related 
actions ‘whose architecture relied on a ‘three-beat rhythm’, 
as Duchamp suggests in reference to Desargues’s theorem 
(Duchamp quoted in Schwarz 1974, 157).
Throughout his career, Duchamp continued to practise 
distributed thinking. He considered works as diverse as The 
Large Glass and his 1946–66 Étant donnés a series despite 
the fact that, to the human perceiver, they look nothing 
like a series. The seriality of these works is, for Duchamp, 
anchored in imperceptible dimensions, comparable to the 
‘movement’ needed to fit one glove inside the other. In a 
pair of gloves, the right-hand glove does not fit inside 
the left-hand glove, because the ‘thumbs’ are on opposite 
sides. However, if one glove is pulled inside out, the two 
gloves can be superposed, one inside the other. Similarly, 
vastly visually different works can be seen as a series via 
n + dimensionality—an actual-virtual dynamic that does 
not change one or more (discrete) elements, but, rather, 
their inter-relations. Duchamp’s work delineates the onto-
logical dimension of indeterminacy, which can never be 
fully instantiated or exhausted. Instead, it forms part of an 
infinite virtual repository, understood not as an enclosure 
but as a dynamic in operation, just like infinity, to which 
23 Many of Duchamp’s works explore other dimensions, virtual and 
actual such as his 1919 Unhappy Readymade, which was produced 
by his sister, Suzanne, following instructions Duchamp sent her in a 
letter: to tie a geometry book at one corner and hang it from her Paris 
apartment’s balcony to be torn apart by the wind and rain (exposed to 
literal movement).
24 An approximate compensation for this would, according to 
Duchamp, be wrapping (a part of) one’s body—a hand—around an 
object like a small knife, where the fourth dimension manifests as 
the presence of all sides of the object at the same time (2013, 93). 
Significantly, this dimension could only be experienced through the 
sense of touch, which is ubiquitous and has no specific sense organ, 
the senses of sight or hearing.
25 The theorem claimed that if the lines joining the vertices of two 
triangles are concurrent, the intersection of corresponding sides 
is collinear; likewise, if the centre of perspective of both triangles 
moves, the triangles will be deformed according to the ratios of their 
axial and central collinearity.
26 This is not a sexist equation of women with cars since, in French, 
‘automobile’ means ‘self-moving’ while the word for ‘car’ is 
‘voiture’).
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Duchamp gave much thought,27 is a complex dynamic, that, 
in various traditions, manifests as B’reishit or as dancing 
angels. That is, Duchamp’s work does not merely illustrate 
incomputability as non-computability or unpredictability. 
It affords insights into other-dimensional developments 
within determined, systemic parameters, instantiating new 
possibilities while, at the same time, relativising the system 
within which it operates. In similar vein, the work of John 
Cage questions the system within which it operates prob-
ing the qualitative dimension of ontological indeterminacy 
in the temporal dimension and enabling an understanding 
of temporal swarming, which, in contemporary technical 
operations, creates temporalities that are ungraspable and 
inexperienceable by humans, but that, nonetheless, modulate 
human perception and affect.
4  Cage and temporal swarming
As a proponent of non-anthropocentric perspectives on art 
and life,28 Cage was deeply influenced by Duchamp’s work 
as well as by the post-WWII research into machinic perceiv-
ers and data generation, which co-developed with the above-
mentioned plasticity-inflected research into machine learn-
ing and neuroscience. For example, the work of designer 
György Kepes, who mined the ‘invisible world’ with radars 
and X-rays, transforming extensive quantities into intensive 
qualities (Kepes 1956), or, the work of architect Richard 
Buckminster Fuller, who delivered 10-h lectures with the 
specific purpose of liberating the transversal working of 
perception and cuing new synaptic connections. Similarly, 
Cage focused on temporal and medial multi-dimensionality, 
and on procedures that treat sound as an environment rather 
than a discrete temporal object. To this end, and in the spirit 
of ‘purposeful purposelessness’ (Cage 1961), he created 
multi-modal milieus where diverse flows of heterogene-
ous information, both recorded and performed, amplified 
indeterminacy through, among other procedures, the use of 
electronic musical technologies and composition techniques.
Cage used musical duration to foreground the (qualita-
tively different) temporalities inherent in every existent, 
however, small, and show that human perception captures 
an infinitesimal part of the tapestry of incessant worldly 
becomings. Like Duchamp’s use of scientific discourse and 
practice, Cage ‘imported’ another field of knowledge into 
artistic work. This field—the philosophical teachings of 
Zen,29 which are the antithesis of teleological traditions—
fundamentally transformed music, composition as well as 
(notions of) temporality. Cage’s 1951 Music of Changes 
famously used procedures derived from the ancient Chinese 
divination text I Ching30 to determine duration, dynamics, 
rhythm, pitch, and the ordering of events within the com-
position. Similarly, his layering technique, such as the 1958 
Fontana Mix, consisted of transparent sheets with dots, cir-
cles and lines randomly placed over opaque sheets with dots 
and lines, which the performer read and played exactly as 
they would read a ‘traditional’ score where notations are 
indicators of musical actions (Fig. 2).
Instead of determining the relationship of notation to the 
production of sound, as is customarily the case, Cage deter-
mined the rules by which the performer may read the config-
urations that regulate sound production. The relation of the 
score to the quantity and quality of possible interpretations 
was here purposefully indeterminate: one-to-many or one-
to-infinity. Cage’s 1952 Untitled Event is perhaps the best 
example of this relation (although there are many others, like 
Variations VII), which manifests as temporal swarming, and 
is, in this sense, an emergent diagrammatic machine.
Like biological swarming, which relies on distributed, 
heterogeneous agency, temporal swarming is based on per-
petual intra-action. For Barad, ‘intra-action’ is different from 
interaction in that it does not depart from discrete objects 
and entities—that exist as discrete objects first, then enter 
Fig. 2  John Cage, Fontana Mix, 1958  © John Cage. Courtesy of 
John Cage Trust
28 Cage is one of the most influential figures in the art and life con-
tinuum, also found in the work of Fluxus and Allen Kaprow, among 
others.
29 Zen thrives on indeterminacy, illogic and collapsed orders of mag-
nitude. It is the antithesis of teleological rationality. In addition to 
D.T. Suzuki’s work, Kitaro Nishida (in his theories of time and para-
doxical articulation) relied on Zen postulates.
30 In I Ching patterns of life are associated with the hexagrams of the 
divination manual. The various commentaries describe the order of 
the world as constant change.
27 See Duchamp’s 1966 White Box compendium: À l’infinitif: https:// 
www. moma. org/ colle ction/ works/ 18740.
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into interactions with other discrete objects. Rather, in intra-
action, relationality pre-exists relata—unbounded objects 
and entities (Barad 2007) an idea that is perhaps easier to 
understand in sound than in many other areas. By definition, 
temporal swarming unfolds in a realm beyond human per-
ception, and separates actual temporal movement from the 
experienced one. Untitled Event, a collaboration with Merce 
Cunningham and Robert Rauschenberg, likewise, consisted 
of a number of micro-events and their chance-based drama-
turgies31: Cage reading a text on the relation of music to 
Zen Buddhism and performing a composition with a radio; 
Rauschenberg playing old records on a hand-wound gramo-
phone and flashing ‘abstract’ slides; David Tudor playing 
a prepared piano32; Cunningham dancing chased by a dog; 
film clips of the school cook and the setting sun being pro-
jected onto the ceiling; various participants, who were given 
a particular duration, such as 2′33″, performing musical or 
choreographic partitions and improvisations (Goldberg 
1993, 126–127).
As the ‘content’ of the piece was determined solely by 
the formal aspect of duration, it afforded one-to-many or 
one-to-infinity possibilities of reception. Unsurprisingly, 
some audience members heard a lecture on Zen while oth-
ers heard a lecture on silence, Henry Thoreau, or no lecture 
at all. Some thought that Untitled Event went on for 45 min 
precisely, others for close to 4 h, among many other percep-
tual ‘disagreements’ (Duberman 1972, 11–18). More signifi-
cantly, the entwinement of the different tempi, timbres, dura-
tions, pitches, visual, verbal, kinaesthetic and environmental 
information created different pulsations which further trig-
gered divergent temporal directions and affect modulations. 
Depending on the particular ‘micro-movement’ they were 
attuned to, the audience members navigated the environ-
ment following the integral temporal operation of the piece’s 
multiple micro-events. Traditional (Western) music is tele-
ological because it is linear as well as tonal. Linearity means 
that musical determination is based on ‘implications that 
arise from earlier events in the piece’ (Kramer 1988, 20) 
while tonality marks ‘hierarchic relationships between tones’ 
(25). The combination of the two makes music ‘inescapably 
goal-directed’ (25). In contrast, Untitled Event relied on (a 
multiplicity of) integral time(s) which made audible ‘unique 
organizations of time’ intrinsic to an individual source or 
partition with no over-arching development (Epstein 1985, 
58). The interpenetration of the different musical, visual, 
literary and kinaesthetic events created temporal swarming, 
whose micro-pulsations changed, at every point, the direc-
tion of the piece, ‘infinitising’ Untitled Event’s tempi, both 
in quantitative and qualitative terms. For Cage, such dis-
tributed-thinking-by-doing-derived temporal swarming is a 
sensorial articulation of the Zen notion of unimpeded inter-
penetration. Referring to D.T. Suzuki,33 whose classes at 
Columbia University, New York, Cage attended from 1949 
to 1951, Cage writes:
unimpededness is seeing that in all of time each thing 
and each human being is at the center…. Interpenetra-
tion means that each one of these [things or beings] 
is moving out in all directions penetrating and being 
penetrated by every other [thing or being]… no mat-
ter what the time and the space. So that when one says 
that there is no cause and effect, what this means is that 
there is an incalculable infinity of causes and effects 
and that in fact each and every thing in all of time and 
space is related to each and every thing in all of time 
and space (Cage 1968, 46).
This statement, which resonates with the quantum the-
ory,34 indicates the vastness of what, for humans, is the per-
ceptual ‘unworld’ where the temporal, and necessarily dram-
aturgical weaving of stimuli, occurs below the threshold of 
perception. The emergent agency of the different swarming 
activators is very similar in technical environments. As is 
well known, there is a temporal gap between human and 
technical perception, which creates a realm of technical 
autonomy (Hayles 2017, 142). The most frequently used 
examples come from high frequency trading where, as Don-
ald MacKenzie has argued, behaviours like ‘queuing’ (where 
existing bids are altered on the basis of temporal advantage, 
according to the ‘first come first served’ rule (Mackenzie 
2019, 50) and ‘spoofing’, which refers to the placement and 
cancellation of orders, based on the millisecond temporal 
advantage and price drops caused by cancellations (48–49) 
are produced. High frequency trading is, of course, a specific 
domain of human-machinic endeavour.
However, the reason why these behaviours are relevant 
is that they show, in qualitative terms, that informational-
algorithmic ecologies do not consist of pre-formed, immu-
table interfaces. Algorithmic interaction is, instead, full of 
complex ‘swarm behaviours’ (Lange 2016) predicated on 
temporal processes that brim under the surface of machinic 
operations, for example, accelerated pattern recognition and 
31 Chance-based dramaturgy seems like an oxymoron. Dramaturgy 
organises the direction and flow of the drama (action), but can, as 
Duchamp’s work shows, also be chance-based.
32 Prepared piano originated with Cage’s (1942) Wonderful Widow of 
Eighteen Springs, performed as a percussive action on the outside of 
the piano.
33 Suzuki was famous for demonstrating the non-primacy of human 
communicators over environmental and other-than-human ones. He 
spoke exceptionally softly and kept lecture hall windows open. His 
lectures were often mixed with, if not overpowered by the outside 
noise.
34 See Bohm (2002) Wholeness and the Implicate Order. Routledge, 
London.
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syntheses of diverse inputs. Despite expressions like ‘web-
pages’, the internet does not (or no longer) consists of pages 
but is, instead, an interpenetration of multiple ‘temporal 
latencies’ (Dieter and Guthier 2019, 63). In asynchronous 
scripts, such as JavaScript and XML, applications ‘continu-
ally respond to input and work through interrelated scripts, 
style-sheets and mark-up’ (63). Their ‘geographically dis-
persed operations’ do not ‘resolve into a uniform, mechani-
cal rhythm’; on the contrary, they ‘propagate a fluctuating 
momentum based on highly dispersed ‘data-pours’ (Hel-
mond quoted in Dieter and Gauthier 2019, 63; emphasis 
mine). The dynamism of these processes and their micro-
pulsations produces affective modulations, some of which 
are used to instrumental ends. However, although the various 
authors focus on the political effects of chrono-design, they 
also acknowledge that anything that can be called chrono-
design antecedes rather than precedes temporal swarming, 
inherent in micro-temporal machine processing. By defini-
tion, information is never first ‘composed’ then presented. 
It is always already operationally active (Shannon 1949; 
Hansen 2015), which is to say that it is changing all the 
time. Michael Dieter and David Gauthier call this medium-
inherent process tertium quid or ‘third something’, a form 
of subterranean interpenetration and communication—in 
Shannon’s sense of the word—through the intersection and 
binding of ‘signals into reiterative sequences of action’, 
and the ‘production of divergent temporal processes’ from 
what they call the ‘milieu intérieur of machines’ (Dieter and 
Gauthier 2019, 66). Like integral time in Untitled Event (of 
a dog barking, poetry being recited, or images of the college 
cook flashing), interior machinic developments manifest as 
an operational split between human perception and techni-
cal operations. For Mark Hansen, this highlights the pro-
duction of two different registers ‘the experiential and the 
operational’ (Hansen 2015, 71) establishing ‘the experiential 
duration of consciousness versus the operational micro-tem-
porality of the apparatus’ (37). As in a temporally swarming 
composition, micro-sensors, computational processors and 
algorithmic operations environmentally transform the very 
possibilities for perception (Dieter and Gauthier 2019, 67).
The crucial point in both Cage et al.’s composition and 
technical environments analysed by Lange, Hayles, Dieter 
and Gauthier is that temporal swarming, which operates 
through aggregation, de- and re-aggregation, has a per-
formative effect. It unfurls new temporal directions and 
triggers novel behaviours, which further cue action-reaction 
sequences. Yet, because swarming is an emergent diagram-
matic machine, they do not follow, or conform to, easily 
comprehensible paths. Rather, they set things in motion 
through elastic connections, formations and transformations 
in and of different registers, opening onto infinity that is both 
changing all the time and ‘inscribed’ in generative machinic 
processes. The dichotomy of inscription and unforeseeable 
development, perceived as randomness, stands in the way 
of understanding another aspect of alien thought: the fact 
that indeterminacy is not independent of but forms part of 
operative rule architectures. Working with Chinese charac-
ters in a non-digital realm, Xu Bing sheds light on the co-
emergence, and more importantly, the co-constitutivity of 
these processes.
5  Xu and inscriptive‑significational errance
To err means to wander freely or stray from a set or pro-
grammed (inscribed and prescribed) path. Over the past 
3 decades, the Chinese avant-garde artist Xu Bing35 has 
developed a particular diagrammatic machine in the field of 
inscriptive praxis and culture. This diagrammatic machine 
makes it possible to understand the realm beyond the pro-
gramming-randomness dichotomy while, at the same time, 
hinting at the mutation of representation itself. Opening 
the underlying indeterminacy of all writing and inscription 
to scrutiny by way of multi-directional errance in signifi-
cational and graphic ecologies, Xu’s work articulates the 
non-abstract, non-universal nature of inscription through the 
embodied and contextually embedded practice of calligra-
phy. Unlike the English alphabet, where B or G are invari-
ant abstract symbols despite the fact that their combinations 
with other letters form different words, Chinese characters 
are condensed images. They are also logographic. Each 
character stands for one morpheme (instead of an individual 
phoneme of the spoken language) and is, in the majority 
of cases, composed of a semantic radical and a phonetic 
component (Chen et al. 1996). Although most characters 
share the same radicals, fall into the same semantic category, 
and have a similar shape, there are also groups of radical-
opaque characters, which share the same sematic radicals 
but have no semantic relation whatsoever (T’sou 1981). This 
non-representational complexity has been hypothesised as 
correlated to the use of (human) neural networks that are 
not usually activated in the processing of Latin or English 
alphabets—in other words, in the processing of invariant 
abstract symbols (Tan et al. 2001).
The fact that Chinese characters encompass time, event-
hood and praxis as well as retain their visual genealogy 
and mutability is also the reason why calligraphy has, for 
millennia, played such an important role in natural-cultural 
inscription.36 Xu’s 1987 A Book from the Sky, also known as 
35 Xu, like Wenda Gu, Song Dong, Qiu Zhije, Yin Xiuzhen and, 
Wang Luyen, belongs to the Chinese avant-garde.
36 Although an elaborate discussion of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ in the 
Chinese heritage is beyond the scope of this essay, suffice it to say 
that Xu’s work in this domain is related both to his own acculturation 
and his interactions with other-than-human entities. In a conversa-
tion with Simon Leung and Janet A. Kaplan, Xu says: ‘When Chinese 
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A Mirror to Analyse the World, consists of several 500-foot 
hand scrolls on which thousands of characters are printed in 
ink-painting style. Set in front of the scrolls are also boxes of 
books bound in blue paper to resemble traditional Chinese 
books (Fig. 3).
The characters, which Xu spent years carving, are com-
posed in the same way as regular Chinese characters; they 
also look like real Chinese characters from afar. Yet upon 
closer examination, these characters form deviant or non-
existent words. In Chinese calligraphy, where landscape 
is a pictographic calligraphic formation, the calligraphic 
stroke is the embodiment of nature’s forces, as can be seen 
in Xu’s 1999–2000 Landscript Sketchbooks which—liter-
ally—render landscape as calligraphic writing. In the Book 
from the Sky, the cosmological setup is a configuration that 
manifests elements generative of a world. Xu’s in-between 
characters emerged from a recombination of the existing 
characters’ parts and fragments, which are modular, since, 
in Chinese writing, simpler units recur in more complex 
cosmo-graphics. The reason why the characters oscillate 
between intelligibility and unintelligibility is that they fol-
low a pattern of formal repetition, a deterministic proce-
dure, comparable to those of Duchamp and Cage. As Jean 
François Billeter notes in his treatise on the Chinese art of 
writing, a well-formed character should possess an ‘organic 
autonomy’ equivalent to that of a living being; it should be 
fitted in an imaginary square, with a centre of gravity and a 
‘silhouette’—as clean an outline as possible (Billeter 1990, 
32–34). In complex characters, the different parts should be 
adjusted in terms of size and density to give the character 
a ‘body sense’ (34). This last point is crucially important 
as a character of appropriate size, density and ‘body sense’ 
acts as an ‘empirical paradigm for synthesis’ (36; emphasis 
mine). Acting as an empirical paradigm for synthesis further 
reiterates that characters do not represent a signified. Rather, 
they afford a non-abstract synthesis, dependent on execution 
and the particularity of that execution. This further means 
that change and mutation are part and parcel of the rule 
structure, not separate from it.
The diagrammatic nature of Chinese characters comes 
from marginally varied emphases and combinations of dif-
ferent modular parts. It’s highly unlikely that Xu had Jacques 
Lacan in mind while working on The Book from the Sky, 
however, Lacan provides a pertinent parable when, referring 
to his Ecrits, he says: ‘they should be placed in water … in 
order to unfold’ (Lacan 2013, 27). Unfolding is a spatial 
and temporal movement, which, when occurring in a textual 
or calligraphic ecology, is iterative and intra-actional. Xu’s 
work does not radically change Chinese characters. Instead, 
it relies on the movement of recursive repetition, which trig-
gers and co-constitutes emergent paths in a microscopically 
errant manner, through marginally varied emphasis. Given 
its cosmological, environmental, and embodied nature, Chi-
nese writing is inseparable from cultivation or culture.37 To 
understand the process of algorithmic self-creation, usually 
described as opaque, unknowable, even dangerous, as in 
the much-quoted Ullman’s remark: ‘when code passes into 
algorithms and algorithms begin to create new algorithms 
there is no knowing what will happen!’ (Ullman quoted in 
McCorduck 2019, 253), it’s important to understand the 
medial aspect of inscription, which is anything but invari-
ant. As Vismann has argued, inscription is inseparable from 
self-praxis and cultivation (Vismann 2013).
Indeed, there is a clear point of comparison between 
culture—as mutual co-constitutivity of agents and environ-
ments—and neural networks, where connections are modu-
lated through a (re)-distribution of weights which contribute 
Fig. 3  Xu Bing, Book From the Sky, 1987–1991. Mixed media instal-
lation/ hand-printed books and scrolls printed from blocks inscribed 
with “false” Chinese characters. Installation view at Ullens Center for 
Contemporary Art, Beijing, China, 2018. ©Xu Bing Studio. Courtesy 
of Xu Bing Studio
Footnote 36 (continued)
children learn to write, we spend a lot of time memorizing and trac-
ing characters in calligraphy lessons. My father would ask me to do 
a page every day. The purpose was not really to learn specific char-
acters but rather to teach me discipline within a particular cultural 
framework […]. During the Cultural Revolution Mao was promoting 
simplified characters. We spent a lot of time memorizing new words. 
Then they would change the words the next year and we would mem-
orize them again’ (Xu in Xu et al. 1999, 92). In 1994–1995, Xu cre-
ated The American Silkworm series where live silk moths lay eggs on 
blank book pages and span silk on various objects, establishing an 
interrelation between two deterministic systems: human writing, and 
‘nature’s’ patterns. Apart from associating braille with the patterns of 
eggs laid on the surface of the open pages, this work also captures the 
manifold intersections between the patterns of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’.
37 As mentioned above, in Chinese thought, nature is not opposed to 
culture. This separation is the product of Modernism, the industrial 
revolution, and its social repercussions.
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to the tendency of neurons ‘to fire through a function of 
the strength of the connection’ (Wyse 2020, 96). Neural 
networks create media based on the mechanisms config-
ured during training on input data. However, what is also 
transparent in neural networks, in supervised and in rein-
forced learning, is the consecutively monitored and modi-
fied model of emergence, which has both an empirical and 
significational relevance. As Paul Bodily and Dan Ventura, 
whose work focuses on the mediality of the neural networks’ 
modulating affordances (rather than on output), suggest, an 
auto-productive, autonomous developmental logic, evident 
in unsupervised learning, is fundamental to neural networks 
(Bodily and Ventura 2018). ‘Auto-productive’ here suggests 
both self-movement and repetition. And, as Catherine Mala-
bou has argued, in all machinic operations, any notion of 
invariant repetition is accompanied by spontaneous move-
ment, given that the ‘automatic’ in auto-production—on 
which autonomy depends—comes from the double valence 
of automatism: as involuntary repetition and spontaneous 
movement, as both ‘constraint and freedom’ (Malabou 2019, 
100).
Much like Xu explicitly works with traditional forms to 
produce novelty, interactive algorithmic ecologies are con-
stantly changing, not in a consecutive way, as in supervised 
or reinforced machine learning, but as perpetual oscillations 
between intelligibility and unintelligibility. In deep learn-
ing network architectures, neurons are connected through 
synaptic weights to neurons in deeper layers. Typically, the 
adjustment of weights is seen as part of processual program-
ming, where human intervention alternates, in a consecutive 
manner, with the generative aspect of the networks. How-
ever, the difference between these operations and ‘algo-
rithmic contagions’, as Neil Johnson and Ullman call them 
(Johnson 2019; Ullman 2019), is that the former are know-
able, or semi-knowable, while the latter are unknowable. 
And this is precisely where the piloting role of empirical 
and significational indeterminacy comes in. Xu’s work does 
not foreground a change of agencies (human intervention 
alternating with material and machinic agents) but, rather, 
a semi-miasmic operation in a state of almost-equilibrium. 
The dynamics of this operation, which are modulatory, are 
inseparable from iterative change in reading as well as in 
writing.
Xu’s Introduction to New English Calligraphy, first 
shown in 1996 in Finland, demonstrates this process in an 
even more striking way. As in The Book from the Sky, in this 
work, graphs assembled from the basic strokes of brush-
written calligraphy appear to be Chinese characters but are, 
in fact, a mixture of Chinese-looking Roman letters spelling 
the words of nursery rhymes, sayings from Chairman Mao 
as well as non-existent characters that emphasise, even more 
than the existing words, the contagion created by the trans-
position of the former to the latter. The installation is staged 
as a workshop where viewers practise this in-between cal-
ligraphy, generating different characters—as well as different 
meanings and conversations—through iterative modulation. 
As Xu reports, many visitors wrote to him in this in-between 
language that they had learned and perfected (Xu et al. 
1999). The specific brand of distributed-thinking-by-doing 
Xu employs in this work relies on shape, emphasis, and 
interaction, however, also on the mutually co-constitutive 
relationship of rules to praxis and execution. In addition to 
showing the underlying graphic, significational and cultural 
disequilibrium of both inscription and action, Xu’s work also 
shows that navigating the disequilibrium requires a sensitive 
distribution of agential moments across objects and entities, 
in other words: actional multi-agent thinking.
6  Conclusion
For Malabou, thinking, human or artificial, is a method 
that continually re-combines and re-articulates, creating an 
always-changing-almost-equilibrium. This action- and oper-
ation-orientated notion of intelligence—not as an innate dis-
position or programmed ability, but as a process that ‘unfurls 
continuously’—hinges on Jean Piaget’s interpretation of 
equilibrium as a ‘mobile point of stability’ (Piaget quoted 
in Malabou 2019, 10) as well as on Dewey’s ‘method’—a 
sequence of changes and transitions, a ‘constant adaptation 
in time’ (12). Such a dynamic reveals the Möbius-strip-like 
relationship of deterministic parameters to indeterminacy, of 
design to chance, rule to iteration, and otherness to identity, 
which is transversal and co-constitutive. As a method and 
process, distributed-thinking-by-doing emerges from de- and 
re-composition, dis- and re-location, errance and plasticity, 
constantly modulating its operational coherence and creat-
ing new unknowns. Such thinking cannot be aligned—either 
in the discussed artistic or in machinic/algorithmic proce-
dures—with sequence-locked axioms or with randomness. 
Rather, distributed-thinking-by-doing is a-rational. In the 
experimental tradition, a-rationality is neither rational nor 
irrational; neither entirely determined by a sequence- and 
logic-locked procedure (as the Latin root of the word, ratio 
from reor—to count, calculate—would suggest), nor pro-
cedure-less. As the above artists’ work shows, it is always 
medium-specific, where the medium, in Vismann’s sense of 
the word, stands for an entire host of (oscillating) relations.
This in-between, both-and, neither-nor dynamic is impor-
tant for two reasons: every mode of rationality, when taken 
to the extreme, is irrational; it produces effects antithetical to 
reason. Likewise, every form of irrationality, when systema-
tised, appears rational and is (or at least can be) performa-
tively efficacious, which is to say that, in operational terms, 
it acts as if it were rational. To move away from this impasse 
engagement with the manner in which alien thought opens 
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onto infinity and complexity in and through incomputability, 
virtual dimensions, nascent temporalities, and indeterminate 
relations of signification to operation, is needed. Much like 
there is material agency and distributed thinking emerging 
from sentient ecologies, immaterial agency can and does 
emerge from non-sentient ecologies. As Tim Ingold has 
extensively argued, the thinking-acting of the hunter-gath-
erers and their environments occurs in a sentient ecology 
where everything co-thinks in a continually evolving, non-
matrixed way (Ingold 2011). Such a form of intra-action can 
also be called dance. Given our increasingly ‘synthetic’, dig-
ital-natural environment (Bratton 2015) it’s crucially impor-
tant to acknowledge the necropolitical effects of instrumental 
algorithmic operations without falling into the instrumen-
talist trap of attempting to harness—instrumentalise—alien 
thought. Rather, the capacity of non-programmed machinic 
and algorithmic operations to instantiate infinity and com-
plexity, like the discussed artists’ (malleable) diagrammatic 
machines, should be approached in a multi-perspectival, 
infinitely interpretable way, like B’reishit, or the question: 
‘how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?’, both of 
which are primarily performative: they push the boundaries 
of human comprehension-perception by virtue of their very 
existence.
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